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Abstract
Background: Poor governance and accountability compromise young democracies’ efforts to provide public
services critical for human development, including water, sanitation, health, and education. Evidence shows that
accountability agencies like superior audit institutions can reduce corruption and waste in federal grant programs
financing service infrastructure. However, little is know about their effect on compliance with grant reporting and
resource allocation requirements, or about the causal mechanisms. This study protocol for an exploratory randomized
controlled trial tests the hypothesis that federal and state audits increase compliance with a federal grant program to
improve municipal service infrastructure serving marginalized households.
Methods/Design: The AUDIT study is a block randomized, controlled, three-arm parallel group exploratory trial. A
convenience sample of 5 municipalities in each of 17 states in Mexico (n = 85) were block randomized to be audited
by federal auditors (n = 17), by state auditors (n = 17), and a control condition outside the annual program of audits
(n = 51) in a 1:1:3 ratio. Replicable and verifiable randomization was performed using publicly available lottery
numbers. Audited municipalities were included in the national program of audits and received standard audits on
their use of federal public service infrastructure grants. Municipalities receiving moderate levels of grant transfers were
recruited, as these were outside the auditing sampling frame – and hence audit program – or had negligible
probabilities of ever being audited. The primary outcome measures capture compliance with the grant program and
markers for the causal mechanisms, including deterrence and information effects. Secondary outcome measure
include differences in audit reports across federal and state auditors, and measures like career concerns, political
promotions, and political clientelism capturing synergistic effects with municipal accountability systems. The survey
firm and research assistants assessing outcomes were blind to treatment status.
Discussion: This study will improve our understanding of local accountability systems for public service delivery in
the 17 states under study, and may have downstream policy implications. The study design also demonstrates the use
of verifiable and replicable randomization, and of sequentially partitioned hypotheses to reduce the Type I error rate
in multiple hypothesis tests.
Trial registration: Controlled-trials.com Identifier ISRCTN22381841: Date registered 02/11/2012
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Background
Many young democracies seem to be doing a poor job of
delivering social services critical to human development,
including water, sanitation, health, and education [1,2].
One explanation is poor governance and accountability
in public service provision [3-8]. In principle democracy
causes rulers to act in the best interest of the majority, via
periodic contested elections [9,10]. In practice elections
are blunt instruments of accountability [10-12]. Young
democracies, in particular, often suffer from unstable
party systems, lack of programmatic political platforms,
deep inequality, ethnic tensions, and pervasive clientelism
that compromise accountability [13,14]. The task is fur-
ther complicated by the magnitude of the challenge young
democracies face, and the very nature of public service
provision which includes long agency chains, multiple
stake holders, hard to measure and verify multifaceted
outcomes, and many tiers of management far removed
from front line workers [1,3]. Researchers have proposed
accountability agencies as a useful institutional remedy
capable of helping young democracies consolidate elec-
toral accountability and improve service delivery [15,16].
These are independent, non-elective, specialized bodies
of oversight that provide relevant information on govern-
ment performance, and sometimes sanction public offi-
cials on voter’s behalf [17-19]. Examples include election
commissions, superior audit institutions (SAIs), anticor-
ruption bodies, courts, human rights commissions, and
statistical offices. Given young democracies’ weak elec-
toral accountability, the magnitude of the tasks they face,
and the complex nature of public service provision there
is a manifest need for solid evidence on the effect of
accountability agencies on public service delivery [10].
Evidence suggests SAIs are effective in reducing corrup-
tion and waste in public service infrastructure investment
and in procurement of inputs. SAIs are external public
auditors that monitor public expenditures and perfor-
mance, often on behalf of the Legislature. For example,
an increase in “audit intensity” put in place by the city
of Buenos Aires reduced prices paid by local hospitals
for basic, homogeneous inputs by 10–15 percent in the
short term [20]. Experimental evidence has also shown
how a 100 percent probability of an audit reduced missing
expenditures in an Indonesian road construction project
by some eight percentage points [21]. Another experiment
in Brazil finds that “increasing audit risk by about 20 per-
centage points reduced the proportion of non-competitive
procurement modalities adopted by local managers by
about 17 percent [and] reduced the proportion of local
procurement processes involving waste or corruption by
about 20 percent” [22]. However, the experiment found
no effect on the quality of publicly provided preven-
tive and primary health care services, measured using
client satisfaction surveys, nor on local compliance with
national guidelines for the conditional cash transfer pro-
gram Bolsa Família, measured in terms of beneficiary
recruitment and enforcement of conditionalities. Addi-
tional evidence suggests the effectiveness of SAIs may
be moderated by organizational features [23-26], and the
degree of electoral competition in the polity [27]. These
determine the objectivity, independence, and autonomy
of the SAI. Experimental evidence also identifies syner-
gistic effects between audits and municipal accountability
systems [28-31].
There remain important gaps in this body of evi-
dence. First, the mechanisms by which SAIs improve
service delivery remains unclear. The economic approach
to crime suggests wages, audit probabilities, and the
degree of punishment deter dissonant behaviour by pub-
lic employees and elected officials [32,33]. But this ignores
other causal channels, like knowledge acquisition by
audited entities and changed perceptions about their
administrative capacity. It also makes strong assumptions
about the information and cognitive abilities available
to agents. And it assumes negative audit reports will
result in credible punishment, which is not always cred-
ible in young democracies. Second, most studies focus
on the effect of SAIs on waste and corruption, yet SAIs
can also ensure that services reach their intended ben-
eficiaries by monitoring administrative compliance with
national guidelines. Typically these stipulate what ser-
vices are to be provided, how, and to whom. Third,
the extant experimental evidence relates to marginal
increases in the probability of audit and not the over-
all effect of the national program of audits (versus no
program of audits). Besides, some experimental manipu-
lations are unrealistic, like increasing audit probabilities to
100 percent. Fourth, some evidence points to synergistic
effects between audits and municipal accountability sys-
tems [34] but whether these generalize to contexts where
elected officials are limited to non-consecutive terms is an
open question.
This study protocol for a block randomized, controlled,
exploratory trial randomly assigns study municipalities in
Mexico to be audited by federal auditors, by state audi-
tors, and a control outside the national program of audits.
It addresses three objectives: to identify the reduced-form
impacts of randomized assignment to audits on outcomes
such as knowledge about program requirements, com-
pliance with the law and capacity building; as well as
municipal governments’ spending priorities, and actual
spending patterns. Second, to identify the reduced-form
impacts of assignment to audit by either the federal or
a state level SAI on audit verdicts, including the num-
ber of observations made, their severity, and the amounts
of mandated reimbursements to federal treasury of mis-
spent grant money. Third, to test for the effect of audits
on career prospects, and on state governors’ discretionary
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allocations to municipalities. Table 1 provides list a pre-
specified set of expected outcome hypotheses designed to
meet these objectives.
Policy context
Mexico’s municipalities provide basic public services like
drinking water, sanitation, improved road surfaces, and
electricity, to 113 million citizens, though access to these
services remains uneven across, and within, Mexican
municipalities. Improving access of marginalized popula-
tions to basic municipal public services is a key element
of Mexico’s National Development Plan 2007–2012 [35].
The main instrument available to the Federal Govern-
ment to achieve this goal is public spending, including
earmarked federal grants. For example, the federal Contri-
bution Fund for Social Infrastructure (FISM, in Spanish)
provides grants for municipal investments in basic public
Table 1 AUDIT study hypotheses
Primary objective: Impact evaluation
H1 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities are aware of
their treatment status
H2 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities audited in year 1
believe the probability of being audited in year 2 is lower than in
year 3
H3 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have higher
long-run beliefs about the probability of being audited
H4 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have higher
knowledge of FISM grant rules and regulations
H5 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities manifest
preferences for municipal investments more in accordance with
FISM priorities
H6 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities are more
aware of lack of capacity and more likely to manifest plans for
improving capacity
H7 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities are more likely
to comply with FISM reporting and data accessibility rules
H8 Audited municipalities report allocating more FISM investment
funds to localities outside the council seat and to public goods
Secondary objective: Differences between state and federal audits
H9 The federal auditor (ASF) yields more observations and more
refunds to the federal treasury than state auditors (EFSL)
H10 The ASF yields more severe observations and opinions than EFSL
Tertiary objective: Interactions with local accountability system
H11 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have different
expectations about future political appointments
H12 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities have different
expectations about career prospects
H13 Municipal administrators in treated municipalities perceive the
ASF as a more important principal
H14 State governors compensate audited municipalities for refunds to
the federal government
This table lists the pre-specified hypotheses that will be tested to help meet the
study objectives.
service infrastructure benefiting local marginalized popu-
lations. In FY 2009 it financed one-third of all basic public
investment in municipalities, or some 100,000 individual
investments [36]. However, the reliance on federal trans-
fer schemes as the key instrument for improving access
to public services is not without risks. Municipalities’
ability to identify marginalized communities, diagnose
their basic public service needs, propose policy solutions,
and implement them is weak. Moreover, the use of fed-
eral funds for purposes unrelated to the development of
marginalized areas, embezzlement, and corruption are a
problem [36-38]. The principal mechanism by which the
Federal Congress oversees local governments’ use of fed-
eral resources is the national program of audits, directed
by the Superior Federal Auditors (ASF, in Spanish) in
coordination with the Superior Audit Entities of States
(EFSL, in Spanish).
The AUDIT study explores the role that audits play
in local accountability systems for infrastructure invest-
ments financed by the FISM grant program. The study is
based on a field experiment we conducted in partnership
with Mexico’s Superior Federal Auditor.
Methods/Design
Trial design
The AUDIT study is a block randomized, three-arm par-
allel group, exploratory trial on a convenience sample of
85 municipalities in Mexico. Blocking was done by state
across 17 states, with five municipalities per block. Using
non-uniform random assignment and a 1:1:3 blocking
ratio we assigned one municipality per block to be audited
by the ASF, another by the EFSL, and the remaining
three municipalities to the control condition (no inter-
vention). Our reporting of the trial design follows the
CONSORT 2010 Checklist [39,40] (See Additional file 1).
The trial received an ethics approval by Yale Univer-
sity’s Human Subjects Committee (ref: 1106008610), and
is registered with the International Standard Randomised
Controlled Trial Number Register (ISRCTN22381841)
and the Experiments in Governance and Politics Net-
work (No:20121031). All end line survey participants are
required to give informed consent.
Participants
Inclusion criteria for participation were designed so as
to minimize disruption to the Annual Program of Audits
directed by Superior Federal Auditors (ASF, in Spanish) in
coordination with the Superior Audit Entities of the States
(EFSL, in Spanish) [41]. The study focuses on audits of
municipalities’ use of grants from the federal Contribution
Fund for Social Infrastructure (FISM, in Spanish). This
fund provides grants for municipal investments in basic
public service infrastructure benefiting local marginalized
populations. The ASF determines which federal programs
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and recipient entities will be audited and, with regards
to FISM related audits, it can also choose to perform the
audit itself or request the relevant state EFSL perform it.
Against this background the specific inclusion criteria are
as follows:
Stage 1 From the universe of 2,440municipalities located
in 31 states select:
1. States with more than 20 municipalities;
2. Municipalities with FISM transfers in 2010 of 10
million pesos or more;
3. Municipalities not audited in the previous two years
(2009, 2010);
4. Municipalities not amongst the 43 pre-selected by
the ASF for the 2011 National Program of Audits.
Stage 2 From this selection of 767 municipalities located
in 21 states select:
1. States with 5 or more municipalities;
2. For each state, rank municipalities in decreasing
order of FISM transfers and choose by state the five
municipalities with ranks 6 to 10.
The first stage of the selection process of our conve-
nience sample guarantees that our experimental sample
includes municipalities that are of relevance to the ASF
in terms of the amount of transfers received through the
FISM transfer scheme. The second stage of the selection
process ensures we have 5 municipalities per state in the
experimental group; that our experimental group includes
municipalities that are unlikely to have been audited
since 1998, when the current audits to FISM expendi-
tures began; and that, within states, municipalities in our
sample are similar in terms of the amount of transfers
received through the FISM scheme. The final selection
includes 5 municipalities in each of 17 states for a total
experimental group sample of 85 municipalities. Munic-
ipalities that did not meet these inclusion criteria were
excluded.
Randomization and interventions
We use a verifiable and replicable block randomiza-
tion procedure based on publicly available state lot-
tery numbers. The chosen method had to meet two
major constraints. First, it had to be sufficiently sim-
ple that the ASF could explain, justify, and replicate
the randomization mechanism to Congress. Second, the
randomization process had to be compatible with the
operational and technological infrastructure of the imple-
menting agency (effectively limiting software solutions
to Microsoft Excel). The experimental group consists of
17 blocks with 5 municipalities each. Using non-uniform
random assignment and a 1:1:3 blocking ratio we assigned
one municipality per block to be audited by the ASF,
another by the EFSL of the block’s state, and the remaining
three municipalities to the control condition (no inter-
vention). Specifically the block randomization process
proceeded as follows:
1. By state, we provided each municipality with a pair of
single-digit “tickets”:
(a) Block municipalities by state
(b) In Excel list municipalities in increasing order
based on their individual identifier provided
by the Mexican National Institute of
Statistics and Geography (INEGI, in Spanish).
(c) Assign each municipality two single-digit
“tickets”, and do this sequentially for all
municipalities (e.g. 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9 . . .).
2. We generated a random vector of “winning digits”:
(a) To generate the random “winning digits”,
we used the winning numbers of the seven
largest prizes of the Mexican National
Lottery of the first Tuesday of March 2011.
(b) Each winning number has 5-digits.
(c) We ordered the 5-digit winning numbers in
decreasing order of prize.
(d) Our first five “winning digits” come from the
number associated with the highest prize
(e.g. for the date we used, the number was
23862 and the price 5 million pesos), the
next ten “winning digits” digits come from
the second and third prizes.
(e) The fourth largest prize (of 80,000 pesos)
was won by four numbers. To order these
tied lottery numbers randomly, we (1)
ordered the numbers in increasing order;
(2) grab the number associated with the
largest prize in the lottery of 22 February
(e.g. number 36625), delete one repeated
digit (e.g. becomes 3625); (3) assign one of
these digits to each of the four tied lottery
numbers; (4) use this assigned digit to sort
the four tied lottery numbers in increasing
order (e.g. 2,3,5,6).
(f) Concatenating the 15 “winning digits” from
three lottery numbers associated with the
three top prizes, and the random ordering
of the four lottery numbers tied for fourth
prize, gives us a random vector of 35
“winning digits”, enough to randomly assign
17 municipalities to ASF audit, and 17
municipalities to EFSL audit.
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3. We then assigned municipalities to treatment arms
based on the random vector of “winning digits”:
(a) Start reading from the top of the vector of
“winning digits”. The first winning digit is a 2,
so assign the municipality in the first state
holding the single-digit “ticket” 2 to an ASF
audit. Then, use the second “winning digit”
from the vector to assign a municipality in
the second state to ASF audit, and so on for
all 17 states.
(b) Repeat the procedure – starting from the
18th element of the vector of winning digits –
to allocate one municipality by each of the
seventeen states to an audit by the EFSL.
(c) Municipalities not allocated to EFSL or ASF
serve as control.
A worked example of the randomization procedure is
provided in Table 2. The process of randomization was
carried out by the researchers (AO and FM) and approved
and implemented by the ASF in collaboration with the
EFSL.
The method of randomization adopted is transparent,
replicable, and verifiable. In addition, the only software
requirements are a web browser (to access the lottery
numbers) and Microsoft Excel. These features were key
for the ASF to accept the procedure. However, the lot-
tery numbers span the range 00000 to 59999. Accordingly,
the first digit of every winning lottery number can only
take the values 0 through 5 while all other digits that can
take values from 0 to 9. Thus, the fourth and fifth munic-
ipalities in the first state of our study have in practice
zero chance of being audited by the ASF because they
hold “tickets” (6,7) and (8,9) respectively. After the first
assignment, this happens every fifth assignment, when a
new lottery number is added to the sequence of “winning
digits”. In other words, the randomization procedure gen-
erates known non-uniform probabilities of treatment in a
subset of the blocks. Only 4 assignments to ASF and 3 to
Table 2 Example of random allocation for two states
PANEL A: generating the random allocation sequence of “Winning Digits”
Lottery 3/1/2011 Lottery 2/22/2011
Number Prize (millions) Number Prize (millions)
23862 5 36625 5
19186 0.4





PANEL B: randomization of municipalities
ID State Municipality FISM transfer (millions) “Ticket” Digits ASF EFSL
07022 Chiapas Comitán de Domínguez 69 0-1
07028 Chiapas Chenalhó 61 2-3 1
07076 Chiapas Ocozocoautla de Espinosa 68 4-5 1
07092 Chiapas San Cristóbal de Las Casas 65 6-7
07111 Chiapas Tecpatán 59 8-9
08012 Chihuahua Carichí 12 0-1
08021 Chihuahua Delicias 15 2-3 1
08030 Chihuahua Guazapares 11 4-5
08032 Chihuahua Hidalgo del Parral 13 6-7
08066 Chihuahua Uruachi 13 8-9 1
The sequence of random numbers from Panel A is: 23862, 19186, 54595, 42585, 02437, 45776, 09502. We use the first 17 winning digits to allocate one municipality by
state to an audit by ASF. For example, the first winning digit in the random sequence is a 2. Because Chenalhó was allocated that “ticket” (see Panel B, Digits column),
it is selected to be audited by ASF. The second winning digit in the random sequence is a 3, and so Delicias is selected, and so on for the remaining 15 states. To
allocate EFSL we begin at the top again, starting with the 18th digit in the random sequence, a 5. Accordingly, Ocozocoautla de Espinosa is allocated to EFSL, and so
on. Had the 18th digit been a 2 or a 3, we would have skipped that digit, moved to the next digit different from 2 or 3, and used that digit to allocate the first
municipality to EFSL. One municipality cannot be assigned to both ASF and EFSL.
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EFSL are affected by the non-homogeneous randomiza-
tion. Even so, because the probabilities of assignment are
known exactly we can adjust randomization hypothesis
tests and use inverse probability weighting for estimates.
Municipalities assigned to an audit are audited as usual
by the assigned federal or state auditor [42]. Figure 1
provides a schematic layout of a municipal FISM audit
process.
Outcomemeasures
The primary outcome measures of this study capture the
effectiveness of the national program of audits amongst
the study group. Primary outcomes follow an expected
causal order, going from how audits may affect subjects’
beliefs about future audits, to how they modify subjects’
knowledge of program rules, investment preferences,
awareness of capacity limitations, compliance with report-
ing requirements, and the actual allocation of invest-
ments between outlying settlements and the council seat
(see Table 1). Secondary outcomes compare the effec-
tiveness with which the federal and state level auditors
uncover wrongdoings; the severity with which they judge
them; and the diligence with which they pursue wrong-
doings. (If solid evidence of differences is found, we will
do some additional exploratory work, like subgroup anal-
ysis by stratifying on the basis of an institutional quality
index [44]). Tertiary outcomes explore possible interac-
tions between audits and local accountability systems.
We do so by comparing how audits may affect sub-
ject’s expectations about future political appointments,
career prospects, perceive their principals differently, and
whether state governors engage in clientelist practices to
blunt the effect of audits on municipalities of their same
political persuasion. Due to their specificitymost outcome
measures were defined and measured by the investiga-
tors using a proprietary survey, and related measure-
ment instruments. Specific definitions, measurements,
and sources are described in Additional file 2.
Our outcome data come from routine audit reports,
other official sources, direct observations by the inves-
tigators, and from a proprietary survey of municipal
administrators. The survey was developed by the inves-
tigators and implemented by the Mexican survey firm
Data Opinion Publica y Mercados. The survey firm was
blind to treatment status. The survey was pilot tested on
four municipalities similar to the ones in the experimental
group, and the results where used to clarify the meaning
of questions and adapt the length of the survey, as well the
contact strategy. The survey was fielded over the phone
between April 27, 2012 and June 7, 2012. We adminis-
tered the survey to key personnel in each municipality,
including: the Municipal President, Treasurer, Director of
Figure 1 Flow chart of Superior Federal Auditor’s audit process. Flow chart depicting the Superior Federal Auditor’s (ASF) audit process of
municipal expenditures under the federal Contribution Fund for Social Infrastructure (FISM) grant program [43]. Highlighted in grey are ASF
judgements, opinions, and outputs.
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Public Services, Director of PublicWorks, and/or Director
of Urban Planning. It was not always possible to con-
tact the personnel, in which case we moved down the
municipal hierarchy. Given the sample size of this study,
strenuous efforts were made to ensure full response. A
copy of the survey is included in Additional file 3. Data
from official sources will be collected by a research assis-
tant according to guidelines provided by the researchers.
Some data will be collected through direct observations
(e.g. does municipality have a web page) according to a
measurement instrument developed by the researchers
and implemented by a research assistant. Collection of
these data is expected to end on January 30, 2013. The
research assistant is blind to treatment status. Finally,
most outcomes of interest are subjective in nature. This
introduces some well known limitations.
Sample size
No power analysis was done for this field experiment.
First, our implementing partner (the ASF) gave us a strict
limit on the number of audits they would allow us to
randomize. Second, a power calculation would have been
complicated by the number of primary outcomes in this
exploratory trial. Third, not enough data from relevant
prior studies were available to inform the statistical sam-
ple size calculation. Given these restriction we powered
the study by using an unbalanced block design, which
improves covariate balance and efficiency. The only limit
on the number of controls was our own budget, and
concerns for bias if the study became too unbalanced.
Hence the sample size was determined a priori to 85
municipalities. Finally, blocks with four or more units may
have some advantages relative to pair matching [45,46].
As an additional check we will do ex post power cal-
culations for minimum detectable effect sizes for key
outcomes.
Blinding
Whereas researchers and ASFmanagement inMexico city
are fully aware of treatment allocations, the survey firm
and research assistants collecting outcome data were kept
blinded to the allocation. The researchers took no specific
measures to ensure field auditors carrying out the audits
were blinded to the allocation. Similarly, municipal staff
are clearly aware whether they are being audited or not,
but there is not reason to expect them to know they are
part of an experiment. Finally, because the researchers are
not blind to the allocation they will carry out the data anal-
ysis according to the detailed analytical plan in Additional
file 2.
Statistical methods
Because our sample is relatively small and we are con-
cerned about power our approach is to start by asking
very little of the data, and then ask progressively more
depending on the answers to previous queries. The infer-
ential framework is as follows:
1. Sharp null hypothesis test : We begin by testing the
sharp null of no effect on any unit against the
alternative of some effect (e.g. change in location,
scale, or distribution). These tests can tell us whether
the treatment has an effect, but they are silent as to
the magnitude and variability of the effect.
2. Visual inspection of outcome distributions: We plot
histograms, box plots, and density plots, as befits the
type of measurement, for the outcomes of interest
across treatment arms.
3. Descriptive inference: We describe measures of
central tendency, like experimental group averages
and their standard deviation, along with the
difference across averages and their standard
deviations (so-called ATEs). For the latter we
ignore the covariance term in Var(YC − YT ) =
Var(YC) + Var(YT ) − 2 Cov(YC ,YT ) as it is not
observed, where Y is the outcome of interest and
subscripts refer to treatment and control
conditions. This provides a more conservative
estimate.
4. Modeling: To generate estimates of causal effects
and confidence intervals we need to assume
non-interference and a model of causal effects.
We check the nature of the underlying model
assumptions by performing model diagnostics
including testing normality of residuals,
homoscedasticity, plotting residuals against
predicted outcomes, and comparing the actual
experimental data to fake data generated from the
estimated model [47,48].
Because the treatment was randomized with known
probabilities we rely on randomization tests of the sharp
null of no effect on any unit [49]. The specific random-
ization statistic chosen will be appropriate to the category
and distribution of the outcome measures. We will use
sequential partitioned hypothesis testing to address the
multiplicity of analyses and outcomes and control the
Type I error rate [50,51]. We will let exploratory data anal-
ysis and model checking determine whether we model the
outcome by inverting randomization tests or via robust
OLS estimation, though our default is to rely on addi-
tive effects and inversion of sharp null hypothesis tests
(see Annex A). Finally, whereas the treatment was ran-
domized to municipalities, some outcome variables are
measured at the level of individual municipal adminis-
trators. At this level the treatment can be thought of as
cluster randomized. We will analyze these data at the
individual level and check for robustness by comparing
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inferences to a differences in total outcomes estimator and
to aggregating individual level at the municipal level [52].
A detailed analytical plan is available as Additional file 2.
Funding
The AUDIT trial is generously funded by the Institution
for Social and Policy Studies and the Leitner Program in
International and Comparative Political Economy, both at
Yale University, and by New York University’s Department
of Politics.
Discussion
Randomized control trials are not immune from numerous
threats to inference including attrition, non-compliance,
and measurement error.
Attrition
Attrition and missing outcomes can undo the benefits
of randomization as observed outcomes may no longer
be representative of the full experimental population nor
comparable across observed experimental arms [53]. Due
to small sample size we tried to prevent attrition by inten-
sive follow up of non-respondents. We also collected logs
of call efforts from the survey firm, under the assump-
tion that those hardest to reach are similar to those never
reached.We will also try to fill in missing response covari-
ates (e.g. age, gender, and career history of of municipal
official) using publicly available information. At the ana-
lytical stage we will do the following:
1. Diagnosis: We will report the prevalence of attrition
across experimental arms and check the covariate
profiles of units missing outcomes versus those
reporting outcomes. We will also check how
observed outcomes vary with the recorded logs of
call efforts.
2. Hypothesis test: We will test the sharp null of no
effect of treatment on attrition. Failure to reject the
null that the treatment has no effect on the attrition
strongly suggests that the observed units are at least
comparable across treatment arms [53].
3. Imputation: If the null is rejected then a complete
data analysis is only appropriate if the outcome does
not cause attrition and the only cause in common
between the outcome and the attrition is the
treatment [53]. This is a strong assumption. For
robustness we will draw inferences using extreme
bounds, and consider trimmed bounds, multiple
imputations and inverse probability weights analyses
as secondary analyses.
Non-compliance
Non-compliance arises whenever experimental units
receive a treatment different from the one assigned to
them, and it can undermine the benefits of randomization
[54]. For example, we know two municipalities could not
be audited because of drug related violence. In addition,
our partnership with the ASF allowed us to randomize
the schedule of audits under the National Audits Program
but EFSLs may choose to perform additional audits out-
side this program, though we do not expect two-sided
non-compliance to be extensive. Because EFSLs report the
complete list of municipalities they audit to the ASF so we
will know the actual treatment status of all municipalities.
To account for two-sided non-compliance we will proceed
as follows:
1. Using the treatment assignment variable test the
sharp null of no effect (e.g. intention to treat
analysis). If no null is rejected stop and declare the
null of no treatment effect cannot be rejected.
Otherwise proceed to estimation of effects.
2. Estimate the ITT effect and, assuming monotonicity,
the effect of treatment on the treated (ETT) using a
permutation approach to instrumental variables [55].
(The latter is chosen for convenience as it is better
adapted to dealing with the non-homogeneous
randomization. If non-compliance is two-sided we
will estimate the effect on compliers only).
3. Report non-parametric natural bounds on the
ATE [56].
Interference
Interference occurs when outcomes for any given unit
depend, not only on its own treatment status, but also
on the profile of treatments for others units in the exper-
imental group. In the extreme case where control units
benefit as much as the treated units from a given treat-
ment profile the estimated ATE will be zero even though
the treatment might have been hugely beneficial. There
is an effect but no primary effect (conditional on inter-
ference) [57]. To test for the presence of interference and
control for it we need to assume a model of interference.
In our discussion with employees of the ASF we learned
that municipal officials talk to each other with regards to
the audit program. We will assume talking is along party
lines and limited to other municipalities in the same state
(parties are organized around states). (Geographic dis-
tance between municipalities may not be that important
considering the degree of cell phone and email penetra-
tion in Mexico but we might consider it in a secondary
analysis). We will also assume that the intensity of talk-
ing depends on the similarity of the municipalities, as
they are more likely to have interests in common. We
will proxy for similarity using FISM grant amounts. These
are decided by a formula (and some gubernatorial dis-
cretion) that takes as inputs socio-economic indicators.
We check for interference using municipalities outside the
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experimental group (their exposure is random [52]) using
administrative data from the Federal Treasury detailing
what categories of municipal public goods municipalities
invest in and their rate of disbursements. Specifically we
proceed as follows:
1. We define the distance measure for municipality i
in experimental state j as dij = xij × y2ij, where
xij = 1 if at least one of the audited municipalities
in state j has a major with the same party affiliation
as municipality i, and where yij = wijw∗.j is the amount
of FISM transfers (wij) received by municipality i in
state j as a fraction of the average transfer received
by audited municipalities of the same party
affiliation (w∗.j) in the same state j. If none of the
audited municipalities share a party affiliation we
set yij = 0. To ensure yij ∈ [1, 0) we only calculate
the measure for municipalities that receive same
or lower transfers than those in the experimental
group.
2. Since our distance measure is continuous, we stratify
municipalities into quartiles defined by y. Along with
the binary x, this defines a 4 × 2 table of outcomes,
where one column is units treated with spillover
effects of magnitude yq and the other column is
assumed to receive no spillover.
3. As noted, dependent variables will be derived from
the PASH files which cover almost all municipalities
in Mexico. These include whether municipalities
report to the Federal Treasury, what categories of
municipal public goods they invest in, and the rate of
disbursements among other.
Given the definition of the distance measure and the
fact that experimental municipalities are also blocked on y
finding strong evidence of spillover effects would severely
compromise the detection of ATE within the experimen-
tal group using the survey data. That said, we can proceed
as above and define dij for each municipality in the exper-
imental group (by definition treated municipalities score
a 1). Since these have already been blocked on y most of
the variation – if any – will come from the party affin-
ity measure within the block. As usual we can proceed by
testing a family of sharp nulls where we classify as treated
all municipalities with dij > 0 and control otherwise.
Rejecting the sharp null would suggest treatment and its
spillover has an effect. If so we can further test the no
null of no effect between treated units and those subject
to spillover by defining treated as those with dij = 1 and
control as those with 0 < dij < 1. For estimation we use
inverse probability weights [52].
In conclusion, the block randomized, controlled, three-
arm parallel group exploratory AUDIT study on a con-
venience sample of 85 municipalities in Mexico fulfills
standard scientific criteria for evidence-based evaluation
[58], and reporting (see Additional file 1). We are con-
fident the aforementioned measures to deal with threats
to inference will be sufficient to ensure the AUDIT
study will meet its objectives. Namely, to assess the
efficacy of the national program of audits in improv-
ing compliance with a federal grant program to improve
municipal infrastructure. And to explore the mecha-
nisms by which any effects take place; the influence
of institutional differences; and potential synergies with
local accountability systems. Finally, the study design also
demonstrates the use of verifiable and replicable ran-
domization, and of sequentially partitioned hypotheses
to reduce the Type I error rate in multiple hypothesis
tests.
Trial status
The AUDIT study is currently analyzing the outcome
data (this protocol was first submitted for publication in
January 2013).
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